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‘... future pension politics will focus on the regulatory role of government, a role, 
however, that will create no small measure of political conflict around issues of income 
security.’ (Myles/Pierson 2001: 317) 
 
The regulation of private welfare provisions is becoming a scholarly topic, influenced by 
recent changes in research from two sides: regulation research is discovering the field of 
social welfare (as evidenced by this panel) and, vice versa, social policy research is turning to 
non-state welfare provision and related regulatory activities of the state (as evidenced by the 
panel ‘Regulatory Social Policy’ at the conference of the European Social Policy Analysis 
Network  [ESPAnet]), 20-22 September 2007, Vienna). Regulation research has long centred 
on the regulation of public utilities, of science and technology and of ecological systems. 
More recently, there is a tendency towards a more comprehensive theory and analysis of 
regulation which may also extend to a much neglected area of regulation, namely private 
welfare provision. At the same time, with the move towards privatisation of social welfare in 
many Western countries, social policy research is increasingly transcending the conventional 
focus on state provision and redistributory policies to include issues of private welfare and 
regulation. So two fields of research, regulation studies and social policy research, are 
intersecting.  
The paper explores the nature of regulation in social welfare. Regulation of private welfare 
markets is not necessarily ‘social’ regulation. Regulatory policies may also serve economic 
ends or just define general rules for market processes. The paper investigates to what extent 
regulatory policies can shape welfare markets in a ‘social’ way, i.e. constitute a new kind of 
social policy rather than merely enforcing market principles. The ‘social’ in social policy and 
in welfare states is reflected in social norms and in instruments of social intervention.1 
Against the background of the recent move towards pension privatization (section 1) we 
investigate instruments (section 2) and norms (section 3) of pension regulation in order to 
examine whether social regulation can turn into a new, fully-fledged variety of social policy 
in a new, regulatory welfare state rather than just acting as a prop of ‘neoliberal’ 
marketisation. In the concluding section (section 4) we summarize the finding that social 
regulation may indeed constitute a new avenue of social policy. The paper has emerged from 
case studies of both national and EU regulatory policies, especially from analyses of the 
unisex initiative of the European Commission of 2003/2004 (Kopischke/Leisering 2007) and 
of the new state-subsidised private ‘Riester pension’ introduced in Germany in 2002 (Berner 
2007). The general Anti-Discrimination Directive of the EU issued in 2004 originally (as draft) 
included mandatory unisex (gender-neutral) tariffs for private pensions but unisex tariffs 
were rejected in the Council of Ministers. The case studies throw light on the chances as well 
as the limits of regulatory policies vis-à-vis welfare markets.2 
 
 
1. Pension privatization in Europe – dismantling or reconstructing the welfare state? 
 
Regulation is not a new phenomenon in social policy. To the contrary, ‘factory legislation’ or, 
in more recent terms, workers protection and the regulation of safety at work were among 
the earliest forms of social policy in the 19th century. In the field of old-age pensions, 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Kaufmann’s (1982/2002) distinction of four forms of socio-political ‘intervention’ and Hall’s (1993) 
distinction of policy goals, policy instruments and policy parameters as three orders of policy change. 
2 The paper stems from the research project REGINA, an ongoing comparative study of the regulation of private 
pensions in Europe, funded by the German Research Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG; 
principal investigators Lutz Leisering, sociology, and Ulrike Davy, law). The paper draws on results of the 
research project, especially on Leisering (2005, 2007) and on Kopischke/Leisering (2007). 
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regulation of private3 pensions is not new either. In Germany, for example, there is a long 
history of the state regulating occupational pensions. But during the post-war years such 
regulations had been geared to the interests of companies rather than to achieving ‘social’ 
ends (Berner 2007). Since the 1990s, with increasing privatisation of social security, the public 
regulation of private pensions is becoming a bigger issue in politics. In the process, we 
maintain, regulation is assuming a more ‘social’ side because private pensions may make up 
for cuts in public pensions. 
 
The interpretation of the (partial) privatisation of social services in European welfare states 
since the 1990s is controversial. Social critics diagnose a ‘surrender of public responsibility’ 
(Gilbert 2002) while reformers see privatisation as a better way to achieve welfare ends - 
‘welfare ends through market means’, as Taylor-Gooby et al. (2004) described the rationale of 
New Labour policies in the UK. Both sides have a point. The critics argue that institutions 
serving the public good are subjected to market principles and economic interests. Social 
rights and entitlements give way to opportunities in the market, redistributory or budgetary 
policies are curtailed in favour of enabling and activating policies, and individual 
responsibility replaces public responsibility. By contrast, reformers maintain that social ends 
are upheld, only the instruments to exert responsibility change. Private providers are seen to 
meet welfare ends better than state agencies, by delivering welfare goods in a more efficient, 
cheaper and more responsive way. In the 2001 pension reform in Germany, reformers also 
referred to welfare ends when introducing a subsidised private pension, the Riester-Rente, 
with the explicit aim of closing the income gap in old age brought about by reductions in 
public pensions without burdening the economy by additional non-wage labour cost.  
 
Surrender of public responsibility or welfare ends through market means? In pursuing this 
question, regulation is a crucial variable. To what extent are welfare markets regulated in a ‘social’ 
way? Is social regulation just a minor modification of market processes as implied in the 
surrender thesis – is it part and parcel of a move towards dismantling the welfare state? Or 
does social regulation transform private markets in a ‘social’ way - is it a new kind of social 
policy contributing to a reconstruction of the welfare state?  
 
The broad literature on the regulation of public utilities like gas and rail has shown that 
privatisation (‘de-regulation’) gives rise to new forms of public involvement ([re-] 
regulation), even to a ‘regulatory state’ (Grande/Eberlein 2000, Jajasuriya 2001). Does this 
finding also apply to the field of social welfare, and if so, in which ways?  
 
Clearly, private welfare provisions are regulated by governments. But not every regulation 
of welfare markets is social regulation. The regulation of private welfare is not necessarily 
oriented towards ‘social’ goals, i.e., is not necessarily ‘social policy’ in a strict sense. 
Regulation may just mean setting up basic legal rules for welfare markets as for any other 
markets. Such basic regulation allows markets to operate but does not impinge on the market 
process in a specific way, e.g. it does not influence the preferences of market actors or the 
kind of products traded in the market (see Bode 2005). A more specific kind of regulation 
often found in private welfare is orientated towards economic goals, either relating to the 
economy as a whole or to business corporations. Policy makers may take an interest in 
private pension to boost national saving in order to promote economic growth. Tax 
deductions for private pension plans that reward high-income groups indicate such an 
economic point of view. In Germany, as in some other countries, the regulation of 
occupational pensions has long served economic ends (Berner 2007). Companies used to 
instrumentalize their pension funds for the management of their financial reserves, and the 
                                                 
3
 In this paper, ‘private’ includes both occupational and personal pensions. 
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government’s regulatory policy had been geared to support these corporate policies. So 
social regulation needs to be distinguished from other forms of regulating private welfare. 
 
Social welfare differs from other fields of privatisation and regulation normally investigated 
in regulation research like gas or electricity. Institutions and policies relating to social welfare 
affect the lives of the citizens more intensely and more extensively than institutions and 
policies in other fields do. This may create pressure to regulate social welfare in a 
particularly thorough-going way. In the post-war era, the welfare state has become a major 
source of the legitimacy of governments. Welfare state thinking is deeply entrenched in the 
attitudes of the citizens, in social structure and in social institutions: the welfare state has 
given rise to a ‘collective social conscience’ (de Swaan 1988), to ‘welfare classes’ (Lepsius 
1990/1979), to provider elites and to national ‘welfare state traditions’ (Kaufmann 2003a). 
The collective experience of the welfare state as a major determinant of living conditions has 
created ‘welfare state generations’ (Leisering 2000) who share welfare-related attitudes and 
expectations vis-à-vis governments. Citizens may wish to transfer these ingrained 
expectations to private welfare provisions and push for social regulation by the government, 
especially if citizens or even policy-makers see private welfare as substituting for reductions 
in public provisions.  
 
Regulation takes place on several levels or tiers. Nation governments as well as the EU create 
regulatory frameworks. Regarding mandatory unisex tariffs for private pensions, one 
member state (Germany) and the EU Commission even became active side by side during 
2003-2005. EU policies and EU law affect both public and private pensions. While public 
pensions in European countries are still largely shaped by national policies, subject only to 
soft interference by the EU by way of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), private 
pensions are more directly subject to EU law because regulating private markets is a core 
competence of the EU. Moreover, the Europeanization and globalization of financial markets 
entails a growing debordering of national markets for private pensions (Ferrera 2005). All in 
all, the growing privatization of old-age security in EU member states gives rise to a growing 
regulatory activity of the EU with regard to European markets for private provision for old 
age (Blömeke 2007, Davy/Leisering 2005, Haverland 2007; for unisex tariffs in private 
pensions see Kopischke/Leisering 2007).  
 
2. Instruments of regulatory policies 
The rationale of social policy is to enhance the social inclusion of citizens (social citizenship). 
To achieve this end, social policy needs to rely on a broad range of instruments and 
institutions – a broader range than found in other policy fields, e.g. science policy or 
environmental policy. Kaufmann (1982, 1988) has distinguished four dimensions of inclusion 
that map the range of full social citizenship: individuals need to have rights, resources, 
opportunities and individual competences in order to fully participate in society. The four 
dimensions of inclusion give rise to four forms of socio-political intervention: legal intervention, 
including protective rights like workers protection and tenants rights; economic intervention, 
including diverse cash benefits; ecological intervention, including the availability of social 
services like nursery schools, hospitals or advice centres in the living environment of the 
citizens; and what Kaufmann (somewhat oddly) terms ‘pedagogic’ intervention, including 
diverse kinds of personal social services like medical treatment, counselling and education. 
This broad repertoire of instruments defines the scope of social policy against which we can 
measure the scope of social regulation. Regulation in a narrow sense seems to mean legal 
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intervention only. Workers protection and safety at work are the classical examples. 
Economic intervention would not normally be associated with regulatory policy, sometimes 
a regulatory welfare state is even contrasted to a redistributory or budgetary welfare state 
(also done in one of my earlier papers, Leisering 2005/2003). But the evidence from our case 
studies on the regulation of private pensions in Germany, Britain, Sweden and by the EU 
suggests that regulatory policies, like conventional social policy under the provider state, 
rely on all four types of socio-political intervention distinguished by Kaufmann. This 
indicates that - in terms of instruments and scope of policy - social regulation can be a 
substantial form of social policy.  
The breadth of the repertoire of social regulation reflects the need of welfare markets to be 
embedded in a complex socio-political setting that goes beyond general legal rules (see Bode 
2005). The forms and instruments of regulation in this broad sociological sense include: 
Legal intervention  
Statute and other forms of law define rules for the operation of private agencies, covering 
procedures, parameters, entitlements and benefits etc.. Legal regulation may also specify the 
conditions under which private providers qualify for special state schemes that entitle 
citizens to claim subsidies for private pension plans. Legal regulation pertains to three 
institutional levels relevant to welfare markets (Leisering 1992, Berner 2007): to general 
financial markets, with related institutions, especially the stock exchange; to private pension 
markets and related actors like life insurance companies and pension funds; and to local 
sales agents that sell financial products and provide financial services. Private provision for 
old age rests on the operation of these three levels of the economic market. Regulation, 
therefore, has to address market failure on three levels. In Germany, though, only the second 
level, pension markets, is socially regulated to a relevant degree. 
Consumer protection in financial affairs is a growing field of political activity also to be 
grouped under regulation in a broad sense.  When ordinary citizens increasingly become 
consumers in financial markets (and/or in financial service markets) the traditional 
institutions of consumer protection acquire a new role. The scope and the required expertise 
of consumer councils becomes wider. Consumer protection pertains to legal, ecological and 
pedagogical intervention: laws, agencies, counselling, education – ‘financial literacy’ - and 
media activity are being geared to the new financial field. In Germany, for example, a 
consumer magazine specializing in financial products (Finanztest) was founded in addition 
to the general consumers’ magazine.  
Laws need enforcement. Bureaucracy may also be seen as an instrument of regulation. 
Regulatory authorities aim to ensure compliance by corporate actors with the legal rules. The 
authorities monitor the operation and outcomes of providers, e.g. with regard to the quality 
of financial products, to security standards, transparency of transactions, responsiveness to 
clients needs etc. We hypothesize that in social welfare, semi-independent regulators tend to 
play a lesser role than in public utilities, due to the pronounced legitimacy requirements of 
welfare production which put immediate pressure on governments to control regulation . 
This is an open question for research. 
Economic intervention  
Private provision is not really ‘private’ since in practically all countries it relies on tax 
deductions granted by the state. Tax deductions make it attractive for citizens to invest their 
money with a private pension fund. Tax policy is a vital requisite of the operation of private 
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providers. Tax policy is not necessarily social policy but it may have ‘social’ sides to varying 
degrees. Titmuss (1976; article from 1956) spoke of ‘fiscal welfare’. 
When governments aim at spreading private provision to the whole population, they need to 
pay allowances to citizens with insufficient income to enable them to provide privately for 
their old age (state subsidies). More generally the government may choose to grant selective 
support for groups of people defined as being in special need or having special merit. In 
addition to low-income people this may include families, women and other social groups, as 
found in the German Riester pension. 
Even if privatization is the overarching political strategy there may be situations when the 
state has to step in. In cases of acute failure of private providers only the state may be 
available as security net of last resort (financial safeguards). This applies to corporate actors in 
the financial market (in case of insolvency) as well as to their clients. Most Western countries 
have established some kind of social assistance as a basic system of income maintenance. We 
can expect that the spread of private provision in European countries will lead to an increase 
in social assistance claims. Moreover, some – though not all – state pension schemes include 
a minimum pension. Germany was a latecomer in this respect, introducing (not a genuine 
minimum pension but) a minimum income scheme for pensioners as late as 2001 – together 
with the first major cuts in public pensions and the introduction of the subsidized private 
Riester pension in the same year. In some countries, for example in Britain, a flat-rate 
pension had originally been designed to act as a minimum pension but benefits are so low as 
to leave many pensioners in poverty. Under New Labour, a meandering process of pension 
reform and introduction of new private pension schemes has been going on, with pressure to 
strengthen state pensions (‘back to the state’, Marschallek 2005).  
Ecological and pedagogic intervention 
The spread of private pensions to broader strata of society – especially in countries like 
Germany with a small private and occupational pension sector – has increased the need to 
educate and counsel citizens with regard to financial affairs and provision for old age. 
Evidence from Sweden and Germany also suggests that internet-based information 
technologies are becoming more important in pension politics (Schwarze 2006).  Ecological 
and pedagogic intervention are also related to consumer protection. 
 
All in all, in terms of instruments, the social regulation of welfare markets is not as different 
from conventional social policy under the provider state as it may seem. Social regulation 
potentially embraces the full repertoire of social policy instruments needed to fully address 
diverse forms of deficient social inclusion. More than regulation in other policy fields, the 
social regulation of welfare markets addresses not only organisations but also individuals in 
their living conditions 
Several of the instruments named above apply to public and private pensions alike, e.g. the 
increasing role of counselling and client-orientation. German legislation of 2004 has 
established a uniform taxation of public and private pensions. In some cases regulated 
private provision cannot be distinguished from public schemes. The basic tariff in private 
health insurance recently mandated by the German government to emulate the public health 
insurance is a case in point. 
In the literature, the term ‘regulation’ is not clearly defined, it has a variety of meanings. In a 
very broad sense any government interference can be referred to as regulation, like in 
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phrases ‘market or state regulation?’. By contrast, a narrow use of the term as preferred by 
some legal scholars and economists only covers basic legal rules and controls with regard to 
private actors. Against the background of our case studies and the instruments described 
above, we propose a sociological definition of regulation that lies between or rather beyond 
the broad and the narrow usage. We define regulatory policy in the field of social welfare as 
those political measures that frame non-state welfare production by legal, financial, 
organizational, professional and normative means while preserving the relative autonomy of 
‘private’/non-state spheres. This broad definition reflects the general sociological assertion 
that markets rely on prerequisites that they cannot generate themselves and, more 
specifically, that these prerequisites extend beyond general basic legal norms. 
The definition of regulation also includes normative framing. Indeed, some of the 
instruments described above, e.g. taxation, may serve ‘social’ as well as non-social 
(particularly economic or family-related) ends. To ascertain if and how the regulation of 
welfare markets can be ‘socially’ oriented, we therefore have to examine the norms prevalent 
in regulated welfare markets. 
 
3. Norms of regulated welfare markets 
The evidence from our case studies on pension regulation by the EU Commission and in 
Germany suggests two main hypotheses. First, welfare ends are carried by regulatory 
policies well beyond the provider state to extend to welfare markets: welfare ends familiar 
from the conventional post-war welfare state throw a long discursive shadow on welfare 
markets. That is, the quest for public responsibility extends well beyond the domain of the 
provider state to include private welfare provisions. However, welfare ends translate into 
concrete policies regarding welfare markets only in a very limited way, that is, the policy 
shadow of the welfare state is short. Insofar public responsibility is in fact curtailed when 
public services are dismantled to be replaced by private ones. Second, even beyond the 
normative shadow of the welfare state, new norms and varieties of public policy arise which 
can be termed ‘social’ even if not in the sense of the conventional post-war welfare state. The 
new social policy beyond the welfare state extends the space of the ‘social’, retaining and 
even extending public responsibility for the welfare of the citizens. But rather than 
transferring conventional welfare ends to markets, the new social policy goes along with 
new welfare ends and norms. 
Evidence from the debate on the German Riester pension indeed indicates that citizens tend 
to judge the new subsidized private pension by standards stemming from state pensions. To 
the extent that such transfer of welfare ends takes place, privatization of old-age security 
paradoxically leads to an unprecedented politicisation of private welfare production in 
markets. Any change in private welfare markets is potentially subject to political 
observation.  
Issues of regulation which had long been confined to expert communities have entered 
wider public debates and political contestations. The hypothesis of Myles and Pierson (2001) 
that the growing concern for regulatory issues establishes regulation as a new arena of 
conflict is thus confirmed. In the following we specify the two main hypotheses. 
The self-limitation of social regulation – the short policy shadow of the welfare state  
Private provision is more politicised than before also in operative terms – we refer to this as 
the policy shadow of the welfare state, in contrast to the discursive shadow. In Germany, for 
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example, no private pension before 2001 was as strongly regulated, even constituted by the 
state as the Riester pension. The growing resistance of providers of private pensions against 
what they see as overregulation (for Britain see Davy 2005) reflects the politicisation of 
private welfare production in policy terms.  
Still, the policy shadow of the welfare state on welfare markets is short. We can identify three 
limits or barriers of social regulation, two regarding the extension or scope of social 
regulation and one regarding the intensity or depth of regulation. 
First, the extension or scope of social regulation is confined to a rather small segment of the 
private pension market. Even in a country with a strong welfare state tradition like Germany 
the unisex initiative and social regulation in general have been restricted right from the start 
to the small segment of the Riesterrente which is state subsidised and explicitly geared to 
‘social’ ends. Social regulation extends, if to a lesser degree, to the new occupational pension 
called Eichel pension and to the Rürup pension mainly designed for the self-employed. 
Other types of pensions or insurances may also serve the welfare of the purchasers but they 
are not subject to substantial social regulation. In the EU policy process regarding mandatory 
unisex tariffs in private pension (2003/2004) occupational pensions had been taken out of the 
domain to be regulated under the Anti-discrimination Directive. Regarding personal 
pensions, the failure of the EU Commission to establish mandatory gender-neutral tariffs 
may also be due to the fact that the initiative referred to all private pensions and not only to a 
small, specifically designed ‘social’ segment. The EU Commission may have aimed too high 
or it may simply have been impossible to restrict the unisex initiative to a socially regulated 
segment of private provision for old age since these segments vary widely in shape among 
member states and cannot uniformly be demarcated. 
Second, the extension or scope of social regulation does not extend to general financial 
markets, as distinct from pension markets. The social regulation of financial markets has not 
normally been on national or EU agendas. Private welfare production relies on at least three 
levels of markets, each with a distinctive logic and with different challenges for regulation 
(Berner 2007, Leisering 1992: 181): general financial markets; private pension markets, that is, 
markets for various forms of private provisions considered as securing maintenance in old 
age; and financial service markets like consulting bureaus. For each of the three levels the 
issue of social regulation is different. In Germany, for example, as in other countries general 
financial markets are not regulated in a ‘social’ way - even though from a ‘social’ perspective 
financial markets would be prime field of regulation since the volatility of financial markets 
is the original source of undesired social inequalities and insecurities characteristic of private 
provision for old age. Only the minimum income scheme for the aged, introduced in 
Germany in 2001 with the Riester pension act, buffers risks from financial markets. Among 
three levels of markets relevant to private provision or old age, financial markets come 
closest to a pure market logic. Regarding the level of financial service markets, there is 
growing legislation, e.g. in Germany, which strengthens consumer rights, but this regulation 
is only ‘social’ in that it regulates access to goods some of which may be welfare-related. 
Third, the intensity or depth of social regulation of markets is limited. If we can speak of the 
rise of a regulatory welfare state (or a socially regulating state) it seems to be a residual 
regulatory welfare state which targets state subsidies and social regulation mostly at people 
with low income or at families with children or other needy people. This applies, e.g., to the 
German Riester pension. While the conventional provider state in Western and Northern 
Europe had been geared to the middle classes and thus secured political support, the new 
regulatory welfare state seems to cater more for lower strata of society. We therefore my 
transfer Titmuss’s term ‘residual social policy’ to the new regulatory policies. Regulation of 
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occupational pensions, by contrast, does aim at core strata of society, namely employees in 
larger companies. However, regulation of occupational pensions under the new policies, e.g. 
in Germany, is in two layers. The state establishes a kind of meta regulation by establishing a 
system of corporatist self-regulation between trade unions and employers’ organizations (for 
Germany see Berner 2007 and Trampusch 2004, for Germany and Britain compared see 
Blömeke 2004, 2007, for the EU see Haverland 2007). All in all, the intensity of social 
regulation is limited, mainly confined to salary sacrifice. 
It is open to question whether citizens will call for more than residual market regulation by 
the state when the middle strata of European societies will provide for old age by private 
pensions more than before, especially when market volatility will lead to disruptions in 
income in old age as happened in the USA in recent years. 
We can conclude that in spite of strong national welfare state traditions in European 
countries and despite the rhetoric of a social and inclusive Europe in the documents of the 
EU, the shadow of the welfare state does not reach very far in policy terms – in our case 
study, the principle of gender-neutral treatment was not transferred from state pensions to 
private pensions by the EU. Why, then, is social regulation of markets so limited in operative 
terms? 
In the EU-debate on unisex tariffs there were already indications of the weakness of social 
policy arguments in favour of unisex tariffs. Proponents argued that, since private provision 
often substituted receding public provision for old age, private provisions should be 
subjected to the norms and values that dominate public pensions. But in quantitative terms 
the social policy argument figured less than other arguments in the debate. This may be 
rooted in more general characteristics of the EU. 
‘Social Europe’, although often proclaimed, has a weak basis in the treaties and even in the 
draft Constitution of the EU of 2004. EU policy towards social security is largely directed by 
soft procedures as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The requirement of unanimity 
in the Council of Ministers regarding unisex tariffs also reflects the inferior status of the 
social. The weak basis of social Europe in the treaties even enabled opponents of unisex 
tariffs to maintain that there was no legal need for the EU to become active in this matter. 
Other reasons for the weakness of the social policy arguments mentioned earlier included 
the absence of a unitary system of old-age security in Europe and the definition of markets 
for private provision for old age as liberal markets, not as ‘social’ welfare markets in the strict 
sense by EU politics. 
 The weakness of social policy arguments in the debate also reflected the strength of 
economic arguments. However, despite of the discursive weight of market liberal arguments 
and despite the resistance of private providers against overregulation it would be misleading 
to assume that ‘socially’ oriented proponents of unisex tariffs had simply surrendered to 
strong neo-liberal ideologies and interests. Rather it seems to be a case of self-limitation by 
politics with regard to both the extension and the intensity of social regulation of pension 
markets, both in EU politics and in the member states. As analysed above politics never 
seemed to have considered to extend social regulation to the entire private provision market 
(beyond a small subsidized segment), to the middle classes (beyond families in need of social 
support) or to financial markets in general (beyond pension markets). The unisex initiative 
by the EU Commission did aim at the entire market for private provision but, as mentioned 
earlier, this may have been due to the impossibility of restricting the measure to a subsidized 
and socially designed market segment and the initiative was eventually not supported by 
even one positive vote in the Council of Ministers.  
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Since regulatory social policy relies on markets to achieve welfare ends, it has to respect 
markets more than conventional redistributory policies under the provider state do since 
redistributory policies restrict the market substantially. While redistributory policies reflects 
‘politics against markets’, regulatory policies reflect what we termed ‘politics with markets’.  
The self-limitation of regulatory politics with regard to the extension and intensity of 
regulation seems to reflect the reliance on markets. The self-limitation of social regulation 
implies that the clash between the logic of politics and the logic of the market is eased by a 
self-restriction of the logic of politics.  
Social regulation beyond the shadow of the welfare state  
Since we found that conventional welfare ends ‘travel’ to private markets in old-age security 
only to a limited degree, the question arises what other principles rule markets for private 
provision in old age. Are these pure markets, untouched by social regulation? In this section 
we show that the limit of conventional social regulation is not identical with the limit of 
social regulation or of social policy at large. We hypothesize that welfare markets and their 
regulation by governments rely on three principles that go beyond conventional social norms 
associated with the welfare state but are ‘social’ in a broader sense. The three principles 
include international norms, civil norms and social technology all of which figured in the 
debate on the unisex initiative by the EU Commission depicted above. 
(a) International norms 
Historically the welfare state is a project of the nation state. Each EU member state has a 
deeply entrenched national tradition of welfare production (Kaufmann 2003a). By contrast, 
markets are a genuine field of legal regulation by the EU. The EU’s core business is to 
regulate and even create markets. At the same time, the EU/EC has developed substantial 
‘social’ concerns since the 1980s and the 1990s. Policies designed to liberalize markets may go 
together with social policies or even be developed in conjunction (Leibfried 2000). The EU 
may become active as a social regulator even in fields where national welfare states do 
without social regulation. For instance, while the German government confined social 
regulation (including unisex tariffs) and public subsidies to a small segment of the private 
pension market, to Riester pensions, the EU-unisex-initiative aimed to cover the entire 
market for private provision in old age. The unisex initiative by the EU, thus, testifies to 
‘social’ orders and norms beyond the welfare state, that is, to norms and institutions of 
supranational social policy (EU). The limit of the normative shadow of the (national) welfare 
state, therefore, does not necessarily indicate the limits of social rules for welfare markets. 
Being subject to debordering, welfare markets tend to be more immediately exposed to 
supranational and international legal sources than conventional social policies under the national 
provider state.  
EU policies are the most immediate and strongest influences on national social policies, but 
the international dimension extends to the global level, especially to labour law and social 
law under the UN system (Becker/von Maydell/Nußberger 2006). Global social norms are 
part of ‘global social policy’ (Deacon 1997, 2007, Leisering 2007). The ‘social’ at the 
international (European and global) level differs from the ‘social’ at the national level of 
welfare states: social policy beyond the national state includes the proclamation of universal 
social human rights, the emergence of a European or even global public with a collective 
social conscience, and international organizations. At the EU level the ‘social’ can be traced 
in the draft Constitution of 2004, in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and in the Treaty of Nice 
(2000). European declarations of human rights by the Council of Europe also include social 
rights. International social norms often phrased in very general terms, detailed social statutes 
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are most likely to be found at the level of the EU. The increasing presence of globally 
operating welfare providers, especially in the pensions and health sectors (Holden 2002), 
adds to the relevance of international law in welfare markets. 
Social law beyond the nation state has a logic of its own, even if national social policy 
traditions have informed international social law (Kaufmann 2003b). The construction, the 
interpretation and the implementation of norms differ from national social law. International 
courts of justice assume powers in interpreting and even creating law. This includes the 
European Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), the European Court of Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe and the International Court of Justice of the United Nations. 
Besides the (failed) unisex initiative of the EU, international law includes various social and 
non-social regulations of private provision markets, especially the growing regulation of 
occupational pensions by the EU (Haverland 2007) and international accountancy rules for 
private companies that have established their own occupational pensions. International law 
is often ‘soft law’, adding to the hard law, for example codes of conduct for private 
companies under the label Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), some of which include 
references to occupational pensions. 
(b) Civil norms 
In international codifications human rights fall into two groups: civil and political rights as 
laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN, 1966, in short: 
‘Civil Covenant’) and economic, social and cultural rights as laid down in a covenant of the 
same year (short: ‘Social Covenant’). Social rights tend to have a weaker status than civil 
rights. In the debate on unisex tariffs in the EU the prime arguments by the proponents were 
not social but legal or civil arguments, namely non-discrimination and equal treatment. Non-
discrimination with regard to work contracts and working conditions is a familiar principle 
of labour law, serving in particular to enhance equality between the sexes, between different 
groups of employees and more recently also between age groups. The norm of equality also 
pertains to social security. For example, the law concerning widow’s pensions and 
widower’s pensions in Germany had to be changed following a sentence by the German 
Constitutional Court. The Anti-discrimination Directive by the EU has extended the scope of 
the principle of non-discrimination far beyond work, including welfare markets. The 
extension of anti-discrimination beyond the realm of employment both by the European 
Union and by the Council of Europe is fairly recent, in case of the Council of Europe the 
extension dates back to 1996 (Birk 2006: 43). 
Although non-discrimination is not a specifically ‘social’ principle it can lead to the 
strengthening of social rights, for example, when entitlements to social benefits are 
transferred from one group to other groups considered to be equal, e.g. from residents of a 
country to non-residents. Social rights (e.g. the right to social assistance or to legal aid) may 
even be created in order to enable the full use of civil and political rights, as happened in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights under the Council of Europe  
(Grabenwarter 2006: 84, 89-91). The European Court of Human Rights commented on such 
spill-over effects from civil to social rights: “… civil and political rights, many of them have 
implications of a social or economic nature … an interpretation of the Convention [the 
European Convention on Human Rights**, which does not include social rights – L.L.] may 
extend into the sphere of a social or economic nature … there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.” (cited according to 
Grabenwarter 2006: 84). All in all, civil human rights have become a major source of social 
rights and social policy. Human rights’ policies may function as social policies. Similarly, in 
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the EU, social policy regulations sometimes emerge as by-products of liberal policies geared 
to extending civil rights (‘negative coordination’, F.W. Scharpf). 
Besides the principle of non-discrimination the political regulation of private provision 
markets also resorts to procedural norms. Though not ‘social’ per se, these legal norms may be 
applied to welfare markets in view of ‘social’ ends. If referred to in the politics of regulation, 
e.g. of the German Riester pension, the procedural norms are presented as flowing from the 
social responsibility of government – legal policy as social policy. Some norms refer to 
organisational procedures while other norms and rights refer to persons. Some norms link 
the two aspects. Unisex tariffs include both person-related and organization-related norms. 
These legal norms can assume a social meaning in various ways. Person-related norms 
include rights of access to social services and rights related to the process of service delivery 
– above all a whole range of consumer rights. Organization-related norms include 
transparency, procedural security and accountability. Procedural norms do not normally 
imply entitlements to specific welfare positions (outcomes). For example, ‘security’ 
conceived as security of procedure falls short of conventional social security as found, e.g., in 
defined benefit pension schemes.  
We may conclude that norms that rule welfare markets are more likely to derive from civil rights and 
legal policies – interpreted in a ‘social’ way - than norms ruling public social services under the 
provider state. The impact of civil law results in a ‘civilization’ of the social – the application of 
civil law and general legal rules to private welfare markets in view of social goals. The 
processes of internationalization and ‘civilization’ of social law in the wake of the rise of 
welfare markets described above are partly correlated since relevant civil laws are often 
codified in international bodies of law and since national policies are sometimes responses to 
international law.  
The consequences of the influences of civil law and civil rights on social policy are 
ambivalent. On the one hand the process of ‘civilization’ narrows the space of the social since 
civil rights relating to private welfare markets, even if interpreted in a social way, have less 
social substance than conventional social rights under the provider state, related to specific 
welfare outcomes. 
On the other hand, the ‘civilization’ of the social extends the space of the social in welfare 
markets: Legal arguments, as seen in the unisex debate, can underpin social policy initiatives 
even if conventional social policy arguments are not applied to the issue or are too weak to 
support the measure. Legal arguments lead beyond the conventional confrontation ‘social 
policy versus economic policy’ and thus can ease the tension between the ‘social’ logic and 
the logic of the market. Legal arguments are a third point of reference that may break the 
deadlock of the conventional dual contestation ‘social’ vs. ‘economic’. Civil rights may claim 
broader political support than both social arguments (the legitimacy of which is generally 
weaker) and economic arguments (which may be seen to reflect vested interest). 
If legal arguments refer to human rights as in the Anti-discrimination Directive by the EU, 
legal arguments can be particularly powerful. Human rights are a key element of the 
internationalization of the social. Although often also codified in national constitutions, for 
example in the German Grundgesetz, international human rights are more differentiated and 
prior to national law if a country has ratified the relevant Convention. In the field of human 
rights, the process of ‘civilization’ of the social reinforces the process of internationalization 
of the social since civil human rights enjoy a higher legitimacy. Especially in the field of 
social security the Human Rights Committee of the UN has just started to specify the 
relevant articles of the Social Covenant (Riedel 2006). The first General Comment on articles 
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9 and 11 of the Social Covenant relating to social security issues was published in May 2007. 
Civil rights, if interpreted in a ‘social’ way, can be more powerful than genuine social human 
rights. 
As a consequence we can expect that political conflicts regarding social regulation will 
revolve around the ambivalence of the ‘civilization’ of the social, namely the simultaneous 
extension and narrowing of the space of the social. Consumer protection on welfare markets, 
corporate law regarding private providers and human rights fuel a new arena of conflict in 
social politics.  
(c) Social technology 
The debate on the unisex initiative by the EU Commission has shown that private providers 
of pensions do not only rely on economic arguments but also on social arguments. These are 
social arguments that contradict the conventional social arguments of the proponents of 
unisex tariffs. In fact, welfare markets may generate internal social norms independent of 
norms stemming from the welfare state. In the EU unisex debate a norm of intertemporal 
equality was invoked – treating the sexes equally over the life course – which justifies higher 
premiums for women because they live longer. Intertemporal equality challenged the social 
and gender norm of gender equality in provision for old age.  
Such internal market norms are associated with ‘social technologies’. Social technologies are 
institutional devices of producing and/or delivering welfare goods based on expert 
knowledge; they may operate both in a market environment and in a welfare state 
environment. Life insurance and annuities are among the oldest social technologies, they 
spread since the second half of the 19th century (Berner 2007). We hypothesize that the growth 
of welfare markets promotes the spread of social technologies. The ‘social’ orientation of social 
technologies may convey legitimacy to welfare markets in ‘social’ terms – legitimacy which 
is more specifically welfare related than the general justification of markets by market 
freedom and macroeconomic performance. Reliance on welfare markets, therefore, may be 
seen as a new kind of social policy, oriented to social norms generated within the market. 
There seems to be an increasing emphasis on social technologies both in welfare markets and 
in conventional public welfare programmes. In the process, the definition of the ‘social’ shifts 
from general Weltanschauungen to social technologies and related operative norms like 
intertemporal equality and actuarial fairness. 
However, it is an empirical and historical question if social orientations of welfare markets 
are indeed internally generated. Social technologies may be devised under the welfare state 
and later travel to private markets, or vice versa. Tracing the historical co-evolution and 
interaction of public and private welfare is a new research agenda (for old-age security see 
Berner 2007).  
 
4. Conclusion: ‘social’ regulation of welfare markets as a new avenue of social policy  
In this paper I have investigated a type of policy which has been gaining weight in European 
welfare states since the 1990s, state regulation of private welfare production. This is not a 
new but a growing policy, especially in social security. We have asked to what extent 
regulatory policies can shape welfare markets in a ‘social’ way, i.e. constitute a new kind of 
social policy rather than merely enforcing market principles. The hypotheses we derived 
from case studies of the unisex initiative of the EU regarding private pensions and the 
German Riester pension suggest that such policy exists, in a qualified way. These findings or 
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rather hypotheses have to be validated, specified and differentiated by in-depth cross-
national evidence. 
The general finding is that the regulation of welfare markets by governments and, to a lesser 
extent, by the EU indeed has a substantial ‘social’ side regarding instruments and norms used. 
This is not a trivial assertion to make since, e.g. in Germany, occupational pensions have 
been regulated more according to economic rather than social ends during most of the post 
war period. ‘Social’ expectations which have developed over the post-war decades in the 
course of the expansion of a mass welfare state are transferred to welfare markets through 
social regulation. More specifically: 
First, the ‘social’ side of the regulation of welfare markets seems to be growing in weight. In 
the course of the growing privatisation in social security, private provisions increasingly take 
over welfare functions earlier met by public social services. 
Second, regulatory policies potentially (increasingly in some European countries) embrace 
the full repertoire of instruments of conventional social policy under the provider state, 
needed to address diverse forms of deficient social inclusion (or risks) attendant on private 
provision for old age. Regulation can do more than setting a general legal framework for 
markets – regulation can contribute to enhance social citizenship. 
Third, there is a growing social policy that relies on markets but operates under the normative 
shadow of the welfare state. In this sense, the welfare state casts a long discursive shadow. 
However, ‘social’ discourses translate into policies only in a limited way (short policy 
shadow). These findings partly confirm and partly refute or qualify the two opposing views 
of privatisation mentioned in the first section of this paper: the pessimistic view advanced by 
social critics that privatisation indicates a surrender of public responsibility, and the more 
optimistic view propagated by reformers who claim that privatisation only introduces new 
means to achieve the same welfare ends, and even achieves them better. 
Fourth, there is a growing regulatory policy towards private welfare markets which pursues 
new ends which are not ‘social’ in the conventional sense but in a broader sense. In this way, 
social regulation even extends the realm of the ‘social’ beyond the confines of conventional 
social policy under the provider state. We identified three characteristics of the new social 
policy beyond the conventional welfare state: more immediate exposure to international law; 
an emphasis on civil rights and general legal principles interpreted in a ‘social’ way; and a 
strong role played by social technologies and related operative norms. Privatisation and 
regulation of privatised welfare production, we maintain, is not just about transferring or not 
transferring certain social ends to economic markets but about changes in social ends, the 
emergence of novel ends and principles. 
All in all, social regulation of welfare markets may extend the realm of the ‘social’ in two 
respects: by transferring conventional social ends from the provider state to markets 
(institutional side); and by extending the narrow conception of ‘social’ ends (normative side) 
which has prevailed especially in Continental post war welfare states (or, more precisely, in 
the public images of the welfare state; see Leisering 2007) but also e.g. under the Labour 
tradition in Britain before Blair. Social regulation dilutes and narrows down traditional 
welfare concerns of West European governments but, at the same time, extends the scope of 
‘social’ ideas and activities of governments beyond the conventional sphere of public welfare 
institutions to encompass markets and related policies. The growth of regulated welfare 
markets does not simply indicate a ‘loss of substance’ (Bode 2005: 266). Both the surrender 
thesis and the ‘welfare ends, market means’ thesis underestimate the policy innovations 
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attendant on the privatisation of social services and the expansion of related regulatory 
policies. The social critics are too pessimistic about the ability of welfare reformers to 
develop the welfare state in its post-expansive phase while the reformers are too optimistic 
about the prerequisites of welfare production through markets.  
The social regulation of welfare markets may indicate the rise of a post post-war welfare 
state, a regulatory welfare state. At least we can expect that the provider state will be 
complemented by substantial regulatory social policies. This could be a new historical 
compromise between liberal critics and social democratic advocates of the conventional 
welfare state. There is much to do for researchers in the new research area, the regulation of 
private welfare markets. 
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